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2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The above court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to U.C.A. 78-2a-3.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This

matter

has

Arbitration Committee

been

the

Utah

State

Bar

Fee

which awarded cross-complainant $500.00 and

before this court which
plaintiff/attorney

before

vacated a

Miller.

Now,

default judgement
the

trial

in favor of

court has awarded

attorney Miller said $500.00 in quantum meruit and rejected crosscomplainant Johnson*s claims.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I
When does

the trial court have authority to reject or ignore

a ruling of the Utah State Bar Fee Arbitration Committee?
II
Can attorney

Miller

sue

for

a

contingency

fee

and then

recover in quantum meruit?
Ill
Is cross-complainant entitled to refund of a $500.00 unearned
retainer, reasonable attorney fees, costs of
punitive damages?
DETERMINATIVE STATUES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED #78-27-56
GENERAL RULES OF ETHICS #11

3

a prior

appeal, and

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Michael

L. Miller was retained by defendant Gordon

Johnson in a personal injury action (GORDON E. JOHNSON &
JOHNSON VS.

DAVID K.

No. 1-37321).
and

was

BUSH. Second

Plaintiff

paid

District Court of Utah, Civil

agreed to

$500.00

take the

case on contingency

as

an

advance in the action.

obtained a settlement offer

in

the

personal

$5,000 and submitted it to defendant.
settlement offer,
defendant

for

the

plaintiff

one-third

of

VERNA K.

action for

When defendant rejected the

withdrew

the

injury

Plaintiff

and

immediately sued

offer, i.e. $1,167 which would

together with $500.00 advance be 1/3 of the settlement offer which
was rejected.
Third district
arbitration

ruling

presiding Judge

Scott Daniels signed the fee

that

Miller

plaintiff

owed

the

defendant

$500.00, and that he had not earned any fees because he quit.
Subsequently, defendant retained attorney Phillip W. Dyer who
obtained a settlement

offer

of

$6,500

which

was

accepted and

netted defendant $5,000.
Please

see

the

affidavit

attached

that

submitted to the fee arbitration committee.
that an

attorney employment

There

Miller

is no mention

agreement was mailed and not signed,

or sufficient justification for

him to

arrangements for

the case

defendant, in

deposition in Brigham City,

attorney

quit.

at bar,

Utah concerning

just made

to pay for his

the personal injury.

His reasons for withdrawing continually change.

4

He had

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial

courts

should
is

not
a

reject

or ignore fee arbitration

rulings; where

there

contingency

agreement,

recovery in

quantum meruit

is not available, and this action is meritless and

malicious justifying punitive damages.
ARGUMENT
I
In Utah it is virtually impossible to hire an attorney to sue
or defend against another attorney.
the only

practical, economical

attorney.

Utah

fee

Therefore, fee arbitration is

remedy for

a client

sued by his

arbitration includes a non-attorney and is

fair.
The first time around Judge Daines rejected the argument that
the fee arbitration ruling was a sufficient answer.
Now, Judge

Baldwin ignores the ruling of the fee arbitration

committee which is in accordance with prevailing law.
judge

does

not

accept

such

If

a trial

rulings, he is letting an attorney

pursue and action "not well grounded in fact

and law"

under Rule

11.
In California

an attorney must attack an adverse fee ruling

and not ignore it and proceed against his former client.

See the

excerpts from the California Business and Professions code on file
herein, and appellant's first brief in this matter.
Now, the Utah State Bar won't arbitrate a
the attorney agrees to mandatory arbitration.
Arbitration must be preserved and strengthened!
5

fee dispute unless
Of course he won T t.

II
In

the

reporter's

transcript

State

of

Utah vs. Johnson,

880587-CA, attorney Miller testifies as follows:
"A - I took it to the point where they had
made an offer of settlement, and withdrew at
that point, and thenV^accepted the offer of
settlement after I withdrew." (Page 5, lines
23-25)
This agrees with the Affidavit of

Gordon E.

Johnson and not

with the subsequent Affidavit of Michael L. Miller and trial court
findings.

There

supposedly

mailed

is

no

and

mention

not

signed

of
or

an

employment

unreasonable

contract
conduct by

defendant.
M

Q - Did you have a contract with him to
receive a
contingency fee of some sort?
(Emphasis Added)
A - Yes I did.
Q - And was that entire transaction and the
contract we just mentioned, the basis of the
lawsuit which you filed?
A - Yes." (Page 6, lines 5-10)
Actually his

lawsuit was

filed and

default judgement taken

before the settlement.
The case

law is

clear in Utah that when there is an express

contract, the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover

the reasonable

value of his services.
"Recovery in Quasi Contract is not available
where there is an express contract covering
the subject matter of litigation." Mann v.
American Western Life Insurance Company, 5 8 6
p.2d 462 (Utah, 1978) .
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Further^ recovery

in quantum meruit requires that it be clear

from the facts that both parties
paid.

The Rule

is stated

intend that

in Kershaw

the suing

party be

v. Tracy Collins Bank and

Trust Company. 561 p.2d 683 (Utah 1977) as follows:
"To find
an
implied
promise warranting
recovery of a theory of quantum meruit for
services rendered or benefits conferred all of
the facts must be examined to determine the
intention of both parties, as to whether pay
was expected by the renderer and to be paid by
the recipient." (emphasis added)
Clearly, the Defendant did not
Miller after

a

to

have

to

pay Mr.

his withdrawal necessitated hiring new counsel.

California case
with

expect

suit

of Moore
for

v. Fellner,

attorney's

fees

318 p.2d
by

an

The

526, which dealt

attorney who did not

complete his representation, reasoned as follows:
"The question is whether an attorney who
undertakes to render an entire service may
quit when an important part of the work
remains undone and deserve to be paid for
partial performance.
As well as might a
surgeon claim compensation when he quit in the
middle of an operation, or a barber when he
had shaved half of a customer's face. The
answer is that there is no concept of law or
fair dealing that permits one contracting
party to repudiate his obligation to render
personal service and hold another party to his
reciprocal obligations under the contract
(p. 531)."
Mr. Miller
performance

of

settlement

offer

did not
the

have the

contract

which

he

clearly breached his contract

on
felt

right to condition his further
Defendant's
to

be inadequate.

of representation

not entitled to recover any compensation.

7

acceptance

of

a

Mr. Miller

and is therefore

Defendant Johnson
to go to trial.
client but

had a right for his personal injury action

Attorney

did not

Miller

realized

he

had

a difficult

provide for exigencies of employment prior to

resolution of the lawsuit in any written agreement.

Phillips vs.

Smith (198 9) 100 Utah Adv. Rptr. 3.
In the
Defendant:

case at bar, the facts are much more favorable to the
There was no written fee agreement, although the Rules

of Ethics require it^ counsel in the case at bar withdrew when the
litigant failed to accept the offer he proposed, rather than being
discharged;

and

settlement for

subsequent
the

counsel

litigant.

obtained

All

of

a

these

more favorable
facts

favor the

Defendant in the case at bar.
The Phillips

case suggests

that Mr. Miller may have a cause

of action against attorney Dyer, who directly benefitted
work

on

the

case,

in

quantum

meruit,

but

not

from his

against

the

defendant.
Ill
By

not

agreeing

acknowledged his
in taking a

to

binding

arbitration

action was meritless.

default

judgement

responsive pleading" on file.
Declarations of Costs

on

when

attorney

Miller

His conduct was malicious
there

was

an "appropriate

See the Order 88032(t-CA on file and

Appeal

which

he

should

pay.

Also,

attorney Mayorga should be paid for her time and defendant for his
per U.C.A. 78-27-56.
In the file is a copy of a letter by
attorney Miller

outlining defendants
8

Lynn Q.

Beard, M.D. to

health problems.

Punitive

damages

are

justified

for

the

harassment

and

frustration of

procedural technicalities while ill, including arrest and six days
in jail.
There

is

no

cover

letter

or

follow-up

letter

for

an

employment agreement supposedly mailed and not signed.
This is an egregious example of an action
in

fact

or

law"

arbitration ruling.
Miller didn't

per

Rule

Sanctions

want the

risk of

11,

not "well grounded

particularly

are appropriate.
proceeding to

after

the

fee

Apparently, Mr.
trial and winning

one-third of nothing.
CONCLUSION
When there is a contingency agreement; quitting and suing for
one-third of an offer, is a meritless action.
Plaintiff is
law,

and

retainer,

he
pay

not entitled

should

be

required

defendant's

damages; and costs of

to recover in this suit under the
to

return

the

$500.00 cost

reasonable attorney fees and punitive

the prior

appeal, underlying

lawsuit, and

this appeal.
Dated September

£~

, 198 9 at Brigham City, Utah

Respectfully Submitted

Gordon E.Jormson
Appellant/Defendant/Cross-Complainant
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I hereby

certify or declare under penalty of perjury that on

the following date I
Appellant!s Opening

mailed
Brief to

four

(4)

copies

the foregoing

Michael L. Miller, Attorney At Law,

20 South Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302.

Dated September

of

, 198 9

Gordon E. Johnson

10

BEAR RIVER COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER

November 27, 1985

To Whom I t May Concern:
Gordon
emotional
summons i n
scheduled in

J o h n s o n i s u n d e r my c a r e and s u f f e r s from
problems.
He i s n o t a b l e t o a t t e n d a
D a v i s C o u n t y ; h o w e v e r , he c o u l d a t t e n d one
Box E l d e r County.
Sincerely,

Yh^Xji*

AUO

Meredith Alden/ M.D.
MA/jm

750 West Second North
P.O. Box 683
Logan. Utah 84321
(801) 752-0750

1050 South 500 West
Brigham City. Utah 84302
(801) 734-9449

nfeefcivED
APR 07 1986
William F. Bannon, 36 98
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON £. JOHNSON and
VERNA K. JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER
,

vs.
DAVID R. BUSH,
Defendant.

Civil No: 1-37320
'

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs1 complaint,
having been called up regularly for hearing on the 1st day of
April, 1986, and plaintiffs appearing by and through their
attorney of record, Michael L. Miller, and defendant appearing
by and through his attorney of record, William F. Bannon, and
the parties having represented to the court that they had reached
an agreement and entered a stipulation on record that defendant's
motion to dismiss may be dismissed, and that defendant shall have
an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $100.00 and costs
in the amount of $12.00 for traveling to Brigham City to take
the plaintiffs' depositions with said award contingent upon
defendant's counsel actually traveling to Brigham City for said
depositions, and other good cause appearing, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
defendant's motion to dismiss be and hereby is dismissed and

defendant is awarded $100.00 in attorney's fees and $12.00 in
costs against the plaintiffs, contingent upon the defendant's
counsel traveling to Brigham City to take the plaintiffs1
depositions.
DATED this

day of

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of April, 1986
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, postage
prepaid to the following:

Michael L. Miller, Esq,
29 South Main Street
P.O. Box U
Brigham City, UT 84302

****ffM

Michael L. M i l l e r
Attorney at Law
20 So Main
P O Box 399
Bnghom City, Ut
84302
(801)723-1784

!><>*

MICHAEL L. MILLER
t#00^'
.<r-* c
Attorney for P l a i n t i M ' ^ g g s S ^ { <r«-Ax"3 L q o * ° ;
20 S o u t h Main S t r e e t W& "=^#-*'^V^#K^J n Q00*** - ^ ^
P.O.

Box 39 9

I

A

^

L

I

^

O

^

Brigham C i t y , Utah 8 4 J
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 723-11
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON E. JOHNSON and
VERNA K. JOHNSON,
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL
Plaintiffs,
vs .

Civil No. 1-37320

DAVID R. BUSH,
Defendant.

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

COMES NOW MICHAEL L. MILLER, attorney of record for the
Plaintiffs abovenamed and does hereby withdraw as attorney for the
Plaintiffs upon the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiffs
have failed to cooperate with counsel,.
The address of the Plaintiffs is 216 West 100 North, Brigham
City, Utah 84302.
DATED this

/^ J/\ day of March, 1987

Myfchael L. Miller/
Attorney for Plaintiffs

•ys\~CC

A^^v^V^VT^rX

MICHAEL L. MILLER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
20 South Main Street
P.O. Box 399
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Tel. (801)723-1784

March

31,

rr&
T

1987

Fee Arbitration Committee
Utah State Bar Association
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Fee Arbitration Claim, Gordon E. Johnson
Dear Committee Members,
I am in receipt of the petition of Gordon E. Johnson for
arbitration of a fee dispute. Please be advised that I have
already filed civil suit against Mr. Johnson in the First Circuit
Court. I prefer at this time to have the matter resolved in this
fashion rather than through arbitration. I am herewith returning
the agreement to arbitrate, unsigned. My understanding is that
the committee will hear the case regardless of whether I agree to
have it binding. For the purpose of your hearing I am enclosing a
statement of the nature, amount and basis of my claim. If there
is anything further that I can provide, please let me know.
Sincerely,

^1~^7^
iael L. Miller
Attorney at Law
MLM/vt
Enclosure: Agreement to Arbitrate
Statement of claim

STATE OF UTAH

)
:SS
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER)
The undersigned being first duly sworn does depose and state
upon his oath that:
In approximately December of 1985, I received a phone call
from Mr. Gordon E. Johnson in regard to representation in a civil
matter pending in The Second District Court of Davis County. He
indicated that he had been representing himself up to that point;
but felt that he needed counsel to intercede in as much as he was
facing dismissal of the matter for refusing to attend a
deposition. I asked Mr. Johnson to send the documentation on the
matter, including court pleadings and I would review the same. On
December 4th I wrote Mr. Johnson a letter, a copy of which is
attached. After receipt of the letter, Mr. Johnson called me and
we spoke about the matter further. Mr. Johnson indicated that he
would let me know if and when my representation was needed. On
December 31st I received a letter from Mr. Johnson, a copy of
which is attached. I responded to the letter with a letter dated
January 10, 1986, a copy of which is attached. On February 4th I
received a letter and a check from Mr. Johnson. A copy of the
letter is attached. I did not ask for a $500.00 retainer, nor did
Mr. Johnson ever sign the attorney retainer agreement. My reason
for claiming attorney's fees is not based on whether or not there
was an agreement between Mr. Johnson and myself for a contingency
fee. My reason is "that Mr. Johnson by his actions, caused me to
withdraw as his attorney, thereby depriving me of my opportunity
to collect a contingent fee. My claim is that because of Mr.
Johnson's bad faith in pursuing the action for which I was
retained, he breeched any agreement that existed between us. I
also feel that Mr. Johnson has no intention of ever actively
pursuing a resolution of the case. He has stalled the matter at
every turn and has gained the benefit of my services in the
process. My claim is that he has been unjustly enriched by the
value of my services on his behalf; and that I deserve
compensation for these services. The basis of my claim that he
acted in bad faith is set forth in detail below.
The basis of the case in the Second District Court was an
auto accident in July of 1983. There is not an issue as to fault
as the car in which Mr. Johnson was riding was rear ended. After
taking the case I learned that Mr. Johnson had attempted to settle
the matter through arbitration with his insurance company. When
he was dissatisfied with the result, he filed suit against the
driver. I also learned after the fact that Mr. Johnson was

1

originally represented by counsel. This attorney apparently
withdrew after filing the initial pleadings and some discovery.
I began investigating the matter to determine injuries, damages
etc. Mr. Johnson was still trying to resist attending a
deposition and I was attempting to establish a medical basis for
his claim that he could not attend. I have included a number of
documents which establish the events at this time in the
proceeding and my efforts on his behalf. I was eventually able to
avoid dismissal of the action. I also reviewed all of the medical
evidence provided. I could find no basis for the injuries that
Mr. Johnson was claiming. The only injury which could be
documented was a broken ribr with a resultant arthrosis at the
point of the break. All of the doctors statements indicate that
this is the only injury and that it did not, nor does pose a
significant problem to Mr. Johnson. The medical bills I could
attribute to this injury were negligible, between $100.00 and
$200.00. I have included copies of the doctors1 reports. I
informed Mr. Johnson of what the evidence showed as to injuries
and damages and he repeatedly insisted that he would get me the
evidence that he had injuries which were much more serious than
the broken rib and the tied these injuries to his medical bills.
My request to him was made several times, and each time he said he
would get me the information. Each time a report came, it
confirmed only the broken rib and nothing further. I have
attached copies of the correspondence in this time period. In
addition, I spoke with Mr. Johnson on the phone several times. On
each occasion I attempted to explain to him my position that he
could not justify his claims based on the evidence that I had
seen. I attempted to get him to focus on the injury to his rib
and to forget about the other phantom injuries he kept insisting
he could prove. I also attempted to get him to tell me what he
wanted in the way of a settlement. He stated that no amount would
be enough to compensate him.
Mr. Johnson placed me in the position where I had to withdraw as
his attorney. I could not in good conscious, nor as a practical
concern for my credibility, continue to represent him in attempts
to gain damages for injuries that he did not suffer as a result of
the accident. I could not represent him in a bad faith or
spurious claim. I also could not dissuade Mr. Johnson to accept
the fact that only injury was the broken rib. I finally set a
deadline, after which I would withdraw if one of three things did
not happen, first I gave him one last chance to document his
claims, second he could accept an offer of $5,000.00 as
settlement, or third he could make a counteroffer based on the
injury to his rib. I called Mr. Johnson to get his decision and
he said he would get back to me. When he did not get back to me,
I called again, he informed me that he was arranging for another
attorney to take over the case and asked me to wait for the
substitution of counsel. I told him I would not and that I would
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have to withdraw. I then spoke to the office of the bar counsel
concerning whether or not I could bill him for my time. I was
informed that I could if I spent the time and felt as I did that
he had forced me to withdraw. I then sent him a bill for the time
I could document spending on the case. Attached is a copy of this
list.
In closing let me say that I sincerely wanted to help Mr. Johnson
recover for what I believed were legitimate injuries. I became
aware of his emotional problems and despite of this I attempted to
represent his interests to the best of my ability. When it became
clear that he was not going to abandon his claim to. unjustifiable
injuries I felt compelled by my professional responsibilities to
withdraw. I believe that I was correct in this decision. Despite
of Mr. Johnson's emotional problems, I believe that he has
knowingly decided to continue a meritless claim and that his
failure to pursue this matter in good faith has been with a clear
understanding of what he was doing. He should not be allowed to
continue this practice, and for this reason I have chosen to file
suit to collect what I believe is my due. To not do so would
be in my mind an injustice to me and to the system.
DATED this /$*£

day of

$/),-, /

f 1987.

f

t^^^^yJ,f
iel L. Mill4r

Subscribed before me this

/-

day of

[}J/)AJJ'

Notary Public
residing.^^JQ^nA^n

O^Uj^

my commission expires ( \xJul

. ; I

I/O
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, 1987.

BEFORE THE
FEE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE
UTAH STATE BAR

GORDON E. JOHNSON,
NOTICE OF DECISION
vs .
MICHAEL L. MILLER, ESQ,

The Petition of Gordon E. Johnson in the matter of his
legal fee dispute with Michael L. Miller, came on regularly for
hearing on Monday, July 21, 1987 at 5:30 p.m., at the offices
of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, City Centre I, 9th Floor, 175
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before the undersigned,
comprising one of the Board of Arbitrators of the Fee
Arbitration Committee of the Utah State Bar.
The parries having received Notice by certified mail
not less than seven (7) days before the hearing submitting
written response and electing not to appear at the hearing.
The Committee having carefully considered the
petitions, having reviewed and considered the documents and
responses of the parties, finds as follows:
1. Gordon E. Johnson retained Michael Miller under a
contingent fee arrangement to represent him in a personal
injury matter.

2.

In February 1986, Mr. Johnson sent to Mr. Miller

a check for $500.00 as an advance against any contingent fee
earned.
3.

Mr. Miller accepted the check and continued to

represent Mr. Johnson under the contingent fee arrangement.
4.

It appears through a review of the documentation

that the retainer agreement between the parties did not change
during Mr. Miller's representation of Mr. Johnson and that the
matter involving Mr. Johnson's injury was not settled or
resolved through trial.
5.

Pursuant to the contingent fee arrangement,

except for reimbursement of costs and expenses, Mr. Miller
would only receive payment upon a favorable ruling or
settlement of this matter.
6.

Based upon the foregoing it is the decision of

the undersigned that the contingent fee arrangement in which
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Miller based their attorney-client
relationship restrained Mr. Miller from applying the $500.00 to
any charges except out of pocket costs and expenses.
7.

The Committee therefore awards Mr. Johnson the

sum of $500.00 less any sums which represent out of pocket
costs or expenses expended by Mr. Miller in this matter.
DATED this 2^sfkday of$2ly, 1987.

cA

riJ. [ \J'

Byr'in B. Barkley

/

The-Honorable Scott Daniels

0311n

Gordon jii. Johnson
|2I6 West 1 s t North
2 Brigham c i t y , Moan 84302

C'~,\ 1 6 I^H

1

'MMMMM^ , - , ; p p - , , .

3 ' l e i . 501 723-3o77

."

r

c

-'"~--J

4 La Propria Peraona
Us7 'fjtiii UTAH COURT 0? APPEALS

5
6 MICJIASL L. MILLfil,

7 Plaintiff/Crobs-rei'si-.-da.it/rltisponaerit,

)
)

VD.

8
GORDON Z. J0HNSOP,

)

9

Mo. 9004-u9-CA
OUDDxeuientaj. .rjrief

Def 3ndant/CroS3-Cou;d.air-a~t/ a p p e l l a n t . )
10
11

Credibility can be mutated *uth consistency, una Attorney Miller testified

12 of three amounts o£ tne settlement offer ne received for plaintiff in tne under13 lyin,: case, i7,500 in an affidavit tc tne trial court, ;>M,300 in btate Of Utan
14 |vs. Jonnson ||I took it to the point mere tney road rcaas an offer of settlement,
15

ana withdrew at that point, and then ne accepted tne offer of set-

16

tlement after L withdrew.

17

Q.

18

A. Mes."

Okay, In the same amount?

19 .Vna :Ti3,0C0 in his affidavit to the Utah State Bar Fee Arbitration ConEittae.
20

It is interestinp to note that Mr. Miller did not mention Attorney Phillip

21 lh. Dyer wno obtained the settlement oi'fer after Mr. Miller nad witndrawn. Thus,
22 fit appeared to Jud,-;e Parley R. Baldwin that Mr. Miller was caeatod out of a fee.
23

There was no Pee Agreement tendered that appellant refused to si.ni,ana tne

24 (only reason Mir. Miller withdrew is because appellant, plaintiff in the underlyin
25 action, refused a $5,000 settlement proposed by Mr. Mailer. Please see nis
26 March 3, 1937 letter in the file."in which he threatens to quit unless tne offer
27 is accepted.
28

Appellant aade a notion to nave nis cross-complaint transferred to District

Cgort after ho was legally harassed, did six days in jail,nad about ^2,000 of
expenses as a result of lir. Miller surreptitiously taking a default juagaasat.
The trial court could have ruled on this motion as it aid not allege malicious prosecution hut an abuse of process, i«e. kr# filler takin:; a default
judgment while there was an "appropriate responsive" pleading on file. See the
opinion in 8800324.-CA.
Restatement, Torts ;/682 (193S) reads: "One who uses legal process whether
civil or criminal, against another to accomplish a purpose for wnicn it is not
intended is liable to the other ior the pecuniary loss caused thereby*"

Also, see

Comment 2 thereunder ana Declaration of Costs on Appeal wiiien is attributable to
said Abuse of Process*

It wasnft necessary to wait for the conclusion of the

trial,
Lated October 13* 1990 at Bri^ham City, Jtah
Respectfully Submitted

Goraon i« Jonnson
Proof Of Ser/ice By Mail
I hereby certify or declare under penalty of perjury tnat on October 13> 1990
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael L. Miller, Attorney At Law, 20 South
Main Street, Brigham City, Utah 84-302

